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Abstract
This paper examines the role of state in shaping the notion of 
moderate Islam in Indonesia within the context of responding to the 
rise of terrorism. The aftermath of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, 
Indonesia faces the threat of terrorist attacks from within and outside 
the country span from 9/11 bombing in the US to Bali bombings. 
Those aforementioned events have shaped the state behaviors toward 
Islam in Indonesia. In this regard, the notion of moderate Islam is 
more than just a theological or political preference. It is a notion that 
emerges from the context of eradicating terrorist threat. This paper 
argues that the massive events of terrorist attacks in home and abroad 
have created condition where the state has come up with the notion 
of moderate Islam not only as a means of inclusions for Muslim 
groups but also to acquire “legitimacy” for the project of counter-
terrorism run by the state. Current studies on Islam and the state 
have undermined the role of the state in appropriating the notion of 
moderate Islam. Additionally, studies on Islam in Indonesia whether 
it is seen as theological or political preferences is captured from below 
meaning that Muslim society is conceived as such (radical, moderate, 
conservative and so forth). This study investigates the state’s programs 
such as Inter-religious dialogue, Seminars, establishing Muslim groups 
of anti-terrorism, and issuing fatwa on terrorism by MUI. 
Keywords: Moderate Islam, State, Indonesian Islam, Terrorism, Rad-
icalism
1  This article is a short version of a thesis submitted to Center for Religious and Crosscultural 
Studies (CRCS) UGM.
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A. Introduction: The Discourse on Terrorism and The Rise of 
Moderate Islam
Three years after Suharto stepped down the world trade center 
in the US was crushed by the hijacked plane, which later has been 
changing the global politics. The notions of “Islamic terrorism”, “Islamic 
fundamentalism”, “extremism”, “radical Islamist groups” and so forth 
become journalistic jargons we consume through TVs, newspapers, 
online news portal and even in the scholarly publication. In addition, 
following the WTC tragedy, in Indonesia several bombings such as 
Bali I and II, JW Marriot, Cirebon happened. The attacks have been 
accentuated with the notion of “Jihad”, an Islamic holy war. The actor 
of bombing using white turban by calling “Allahuakbar” has added a 
point of accentuation which say that here the evil is Islam.
In the wake of global violence, started from 9/11 then followed US 
unilateral action to Iraq and Afghanistan, Indonesia faced domestic 
challenges of political shift from authoritarian regime to democratic 
consolidation. Muslims response toward the growing and intense 
global violence has been very much related with the Muslims political 
polarizations in home which also can be traced back to the wider 
picture of Muslims political orientations and their relations with the 
state before democratic transition takes place (Hefner, 2002). According 
to Hefner, the discourse of global violence and the US unilateral 
action was the site of contestation of more localized Muslim political 
spectrums that was between “Muslim proponents of democracy” 
and “the neofundamentalist conservatives”. In this regard, Muslims 
responses toward terrorist attack that followed in Indonesia, to name 
Bali I and II, Jakarta and Cirebon, can be seen in this light. Moreover, 
which later would be explained, the state which engages with those 
Muslims proponents of democracy at the same time has led to the 
notion of “moderate Islam” in the light of “Indonesian Islam”. This is 
in line with what Hefner argues about the above case:
The reactions and the rivalry were related to three other crises 
simultaneously shaking Indonesia: the attempted transition from 
the authoritarianism of the Suharto dictatorship, the struggle to 
redefine the terms of Indonesian nationhood after the discrediting 
of Suharto’s conservative nationalism, and arguments over the 
position of Islam in the practice of governance and the idea of 
Indonesia (2002: 754).
Therefore, the extent to which moderate Islam is directed is very 
much on its relations to the above mentioned events. Scholars and 
public figures in Indonesia have undermined the term moderate Islam 
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as cultural preference. Some of them often exemplify the very moderate 
with how Islam came to Nusantara and the ability to “assimilate” with 
local traditions. On the other side, the acceptance toward democracy is 
used by some as a point of departure. 
Most obviously, scholars assume “Moderate Islam” as inherently 
attached to Indonesian Islam (e.g. Eliraz 2004, Ramakrishna 2009, Azra 
2006, Ali 2007, and Hefner 2002). It sees that historical trajectories of 
Indonesian Islam was brought by moderate way of interpreting the 
religious text so that if the other faces of Islam which is far from moderate 
is identified as not moderate. Non-moderate way of interpreting the text 
could lead to the other justifications such as fundamentalist, radicals or 
even extremist. Here, culture is very much attached as to fold Muslim 
religious behaviors and so their political preference. Muslims political 
orientations depend on how far they assimilate with local culture. It 
implies from, for example, Azra’s insistence on how Clifford Geertz 
notion of religion of Java signifies the aforementioned (Azra, 2004: 2). 
For Azra, the term religion of Java implies the ability of Muslim to 
absorb the Javanese culture without necessarily become less Islamic.
Specifically speaking, identifying radical groups in Indonesia is 
very much underpinning the very term moderate Muslims. Muslim 
groups such as FPI (Front Pembela Islam), MMI (Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia), HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), JI (Jamaah Islamiyah) and 
Laskar Jihad are to be labelled as radical Muslim groups (Ali, 2007: 
198). Thus, who do not share political and even cultural orientations 
with those groups will be labeled as moderate Muslims. For Ali, this 
category includes prominent Muslim organization leaders such as 
Muhammadiyah and NU and Muslim figures such as Syafi’i Ma’arif, 
Azyumardi Azra, Hasyim Muzadi and Abdullah Gymnastiar (2007: 
198). In terms of its categorization in Indonesia Ali states that: 
The ideas of native Islam, progressive Islam, tolerant Islam 
and pluralistic Islam that emerged in the 1970s are categorized 
as moderate. The same category can be given to ideas to          
re-actualize Islam, nationalize Islam, de-sacralizing, cultural 
Islam, contextual ijtihad, and other alike. The Islamist group or 
Salafi that neither uses nor allows violence can be categorized 
as moderate Salafi (Salafiyah Wasathiyah) (Ibid, 199).
In making this categorization, Ali employs a broad spectrum of 
moderate Islam. He includes the Salafi, who share cultural proximity 
with those extremist and radical (See, Woodward, 2011), into moderate 
Islam category as long as they avoid using violence, although they 
have strict interpretation of the Quran. Through the inclusion of its 
categorization, moderate Islam in Indonesia comprises the mainstream 
comparing to the radical.
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According to Azra, in terms of its characteristics, radical groups 
in Indonesia are commonly differentiated into two groups. The first 
is local model such as Laskar Jihad and FPI and the second is trans-
nation model such as Hizbut Tahrir and Jemaah Ikhwan al-Muslimin 
Indonesia/JAMI. Azra noted that all these radical groups have sense 
of ideological connection with Middle Eastern radical ideology such 
as wahabism (Azra, 2002, 51). As a matter of fact, these groups are 
not part of terrorism as mentioned by the state, although some of 
them have inclined with violence and share the similar ideology of 
establishing daulah islamiyah or Islamic state and the like.
 In Indonesia, there are two major organizations that are 
considered inherently moderate, Muhammadiyah and NU (Azra, 
2005, Anwar, 2004, Eliraz, 2004). These two are simply identified as the 
mainstream branch of civil society group with huge members. Giora 
Eliraz (2004, 87) sees the Islamic revival in Indonesia is closely related 
with this two which is peace, tolerant and democratic comparing to 
the Islamic revival in the Middle East countries. She traced back to the 
Suharto period in which the two have the prominent role in defining 
the “moderate Islam”, especially in the time they accepted Pancasila as 
the single ideology. 
In the other side however, liberal Islam is very much in association 
with intellectual tradition as it is also used in the West, even from the 
era of classic Muslim western thinkers. Nevertheless, when it comes to 
their support of secular model of the state, this is likely to be a political 
stance (Assyaukanie, 2009: 140-168). Thus, unlike liberal Islam that 
departs from an intellectual enterprise, the moderate is hardly defined 
as having intellectual root, though for some, the notion spans from 
wider range of Muslims’ political and religious orientations and class 
division (Esposito, 2007: 26-27). However, in Indonesia, the term looks 
very much straight forward, especially when it comes to responding 
terrorism and the urgent of reclaiming the state’s ideology. 
It is true when it comes to appropriating Muslim religious and 
political orientation with state’s ideology in the time of Suharto 
authoritarian regime. According to Ichwan, the use of Pancasila and 
Constitution as the source of Islamic law, and not Quran and Hadist, 
has moderated Muslims in Indonesia (2006: 124). Indeed, it was the 
consequence of enforcing Pancasila from the beginning. In the other 
side, Muslim civil society groups were forced to acknowledge Pancasila 
as their sole ideology. Some of them tried to negotiate their political 
stance by involving in corporatist institutions established by the 
regime such as ICMI. The next chapter explores the role of the state in 
Suharto era in moderating Muslim religious and political orientations.
Volume 6, No. 1, Januari-Juni 2014                                                                             5 
Angga Yudhiyansyah
In his inauguration speech for his second election, Susilo Bambang 
Yudoyono stated that the key point of Indonesian success is the 
national identity, Indonesianess (Keindonesiaan) which is reflected 
from diversity, fairness, tolerance, moderateness, openness and sense 
of humanity. According to him, that uniqueness is the characteristics 
that differentiate Indonesia with other nations in the world (Kompas, 
20/10/09). SBY statement reflects the state’s image especially when it 
comes into being through programs and activities specifically designed 
by the state’s apparatus to construct what Islam fit in to the state’s 
ideology. 
In addition to the president’s remark, the (former) Minister of 
Foreign Affair Hassan Wirajuda stated in his remark, such as one 
at the Opening Ceremony of the 2009 Indonesian Arts and Culture 
Scholarship, used the term to refer to certain groups that the government 
engages in to support its effort of combating terrorists. In addition, 
he emphasized the government initiatives to make the moderate 
voices heard to the world as representing the face of Indonesia. In 
relation to the government effort of eradicating terrorism, providing 
space for moderates to give a voice, mutually supports the former 
(Kemenlu, 30/07/09). Both the President and the Ministry’s remarks 
reflect the resonance of matters that the state faces that is “the crises 
simultaneously shaking Indonesia”.
Currently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs (MORA), National Counter-Terrorism Body/
Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) and MUI are the 
most active in dealing with counter-terrorism activities in Indonesia 
by promoting moderate Islam. In this regard, this paper focuses on 
programs and activities held by those aforementioned institutions. 
This paper uses a qualitative research. Data comes primarily from 
two types. The first is written materials. It comprises from official 
websites, news portal, official document, books, booklets and research 
reports. The second is interview. Subjects of interview come from staff 
of Fatwa Commission of MUI, director of desk of Social and Culture 
at Directorate of Public Diplomacy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
director of Directorate of Research and Development at Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, and the head of Terrorism Eradication Team (Pokja 
Penanggulangan Terrorisme) at Yogyakarta. Interview is conducted 
in order to confirm and add values of what the government currently 
conceives as moderate Islam and what has been doing in response to 
terrorism and radicalism, especially from the perspective of the given 
institutions.
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B. Theoretical Framework
Some studies on the state and Islam and Indonesia give attention 
to the role of the state as an actor incorporating certain official rules 
intended for managing Muslims religious life. Those studies are 
including the effort of incorporating Muslim figures to support the 
state’s interest and agendas through existing institutions. Those studies 
have given rise to concepts like “state Islam” (e.g. van Bruinessen 
1996, Nur Ichwan 2006) and “regimist Islam” (e.g. Hefner 2000). Those 
studies mostly investigate the role of the New Order regime in shaping 
Muslim political orientations toward the state’s agendas. They mostly 
scrutinize the existing government institutions in this case is the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs and Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) in 
supporting state’s agenda while others focus on the establishment of 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan 
Muslim Se-Indonesia, ICMI) as part of state’s client (e.g. Nieuwenhuijze 
1958, Boland 1982, Ramage 1995, Porter, 2002, Ichwan, 2007 and John 
Olle 2009). 
The above mentioned scholars, except Olle, see the state as a strict 
agent as it is obviously the case of the New Order regime. Although 
Ichwan has been providing the example of post Suharto Indonesian 
state, however, he puts exclusively to MORA as a case study in 
which the findings are mostly consistent with the image of “state 
Islam”. Giving much closer attention to MUI officers, Olle employs an 
ethnographic approach toward the state by interviewing MUI officers. 
However, Olle does not take a case of the term of moderate Islam 
being employed by MUI and how the term is used in the backdrop of 
responding terrorism and religious extremism.
On the other side, scholars investigating Islam in Indonesia use the 
term moderate Islam as mere a label to indicate Muslims religious and 
or political orientation (e.g. Eliraz 2004, Ramakrishna 2009, Azra 2005, 
Ali 2007, Hefner 2002). They certainly take it for granted or with little 
definition and mostly put the phenomena of the growth of radicalism 
or extremism bringing religious sentiment as the backdrop. None of 
them investigate the term as evoked by the Indonesian state and how 
it relates to its practices. In this regard, this study will fill the gap that 
left by the aforementioned scholars. 
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State’s Programs of Counter-radicalism and Connecting Moderate 
Muslim Groups
1. Designing Operative Institutions
In response to terrorism and radicalism, there are several 
operative institutions that have been established by the state 
through its agencies. The first is the establishment of Directorate 
of public diplomacy under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
which the activities of Interfaith Dialogue take place. The second 
is the establishment of BNPT (National Counter-Terrorism Body), 
especially in its functions to engage with civil society groups and 
the establishment of regional terrorism eradication teams. The 
third is the establishment of anti-terrorism unit by MUI which 
uses their network of Islamic preachers across the nation.
a. Directorate of Public Diplomacy 
The ministry of Foreign Affairs through Directorate of 
Public Diplomacy has played important roles in initiating 
interfaith forums. In March 2002 the directorate of public 
diplomacy was established (Rachmawati, 2009: 21). The 
ministry of foreign affairs through the so called total 
diplomacy tries to redefine its approach in dealing with many 
issues especially those related to the global politics, including 
religion. According Elvis Napitupulu, a head of desk of Social 
and Culture of Directorate of Public Diplomacy at the MOFA, 
until the end of cold war period, as a matter of fact, the states 
have enjoyed the privilege as the dominant actors engaging 
with issues and problems that trans-national in matter. This 
has given consequence that whatever problems appear dealing 
with international relations, they are dominantly responded 
through political lenses and not less with military approach. 
However, according to Napitupulu, “since there are many 
issues in the post cold war era that should be seriously tackled 
with comprehensive understanding and approach such as 
global warming, terrorism and the like which demand wider 
actors to involve, the state alone is insufficient” (interview 
with Napitupulu, 02/07/2012).
In this regard, the establishment of directorate of public 
diplomacy is the way to incorporate non-state actors in 
dealing with problems that affected by global and local events 
that have effects on global and also local constraint. Terrorism 
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and religious extremism are the main reasons that the MOFA 
seeks to define its approach of coopretaing with Muslim 
civil society groups. Incorporating the Muslim figures and 
institutions is more appealing in approaching the problems of 
radicalism rather than the state alone, as it will be responded 
by the Muslims in Indonesia as targeting the Muslims as the 
enemy like those western countries especially US have done 
(interview with Napitupulu, 02/07/2012).
According to Napitupulu, for the purpose of gaining 
support from the moderate Muslims, the MOFA cooperates 
with NU and Muhammadiyah in every activities and 
programs of interfaith dialogues. In addition, scholars from 
Islamic Universities also take part in the programs. Hence, the 
point is that as stated by MOFA is “to rebrand Islam amidst 
the asymmetric global order with excessive terror attacks in 
the name of Islam” (interview with Napitupulu, 02/07/2012). 
b. Tim Penanggulangan Terrorisme (Terrorism Eradication 
Team) of MUI
Based on a series of Islamic jurisprudence discussion 
(halaqah) in 2002, MUI issued the fatwa against terrorism. 
It condemns terrorism as haram. For the purpose of 
responding terrorism, MUI established special team called 
Tim Penanggulangan Terorisme, TPT (Terrorism Eradication 
Team) which is aimed at guiding Muslims into the right path 
of Islam and discouraging them from violent orientations. 
TPT held taushiyah (religious advice), publishing books and 
issuing fatwa as part of their programs. MUI claimed that the 
fatwa being issued was a response of MUI toward the growing 
tension of terrorist attack. TPT has published a booklet that 
distribute in a series of halaqah held in several provinces and 
MUI branches. The booklet titled “Halaqah Penanggulangan 
Terorisme: Peran Ulama Dalam Mewujudkan Pemahaman 
Keagamaan Yang Benar” contain fatwa and its explanation, 
including a fatwa concerning the problems of nationalism 
(MUI and FKPMN, no year).
For MUI the act of terror without any legitimate reason 
such as not in the time of war, cannot be justified. The 
issuing of fatwa based on the halaqah held by MUI in 2002 
and followed by other meeting in 2003 (Interview with Irfan 
Helmy 12/07/2012). In the mean time, the fatwa is processed 
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to be informed to public. The difference between terrorism 
and jihad according to the fatwa are the former is destructive 
which goal is aimed at destroying other people with no rules 
in order. Whereas jihad is constructive even with waging war 
which goal is upholding the God’s teaching or defending 
one’s right with certain rules based on shariah. In addition, the 
fatwa is inserted with the fatwa on how to live a life within 
pluralistic Indonesian society. This fatwa is based on Ulama’s 
decision called Masail Asasiyah wathaniyah (the strategic matters 
of nationhood). It contains four points (MUI and FKPMN, no 
year).
The first is the principles of Islamic teaching regarding 
relations among religious believers within the frame of 
Indonesian unitary state. This highlights the legitimacy of 
Indonesian Constitution and Ideology, Pancasila. Muslims 
right is equal with those other religious believer in the frame 
of Indonesian nation-state. Hence, Muslims do not necessary 
to acknowledge other religious believers’ faith. In addition, it 
emphasizes the role of the state in guarding religious lives and 
keeping them pure by upholding penalty toward religious 
blasphemy.
The second is the role of religion in managing peoples’ 
attitudes. This explains that Indonesian citizens are religious 
believers so that the national ethics should be based on religious 
teachings. The government should integrate the moral values 
of religions with every single dimension of the state. This 
point recommends “national movement of managing people 
attitudes” (Gerakan nasional pembinaan akhlak bangsa) (MUI and 
FKPMN, no year).
The third is implementation of Islam as rahmatan lil alamin 
(blessing for the entire universe) in the frame of societal, 
national and state’s lives. Islam is a religion that covers every 
single problem concerning the societal and national lives. 
Pancasila is acknowledged as an open ideology that could be 
considered as a commitment and source of law, inspirations 
and thought of all citizens within living pluralistically. 
Because of its all-encompassing religion in every time and 
space (shalihun likulli zamanin wa makanin), Islam should be a 
source of managing national lives. The fourth is the right to 
vote and choosing the political leaders. Islam acknowledges 
election as a commitment to choose the right leaders in order 
to uphold imamah (religious leadership) and imarah (political 
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leadership). Therefore, Muslims should choose a leader that 
can accommodate Islam as it is based on faith and submission 
to God (taqwa) and those having moral commitment such as 
honesty and having integrity. Those points have been inserted 
with Islamic texts from Al-Quran and Hadist and so the 
opinions of ancient Ulamas such as Imama Al-Ghazali and Al-
Mawardi as did the fatwa on terrorism (MUI and FKPMN, no 
year).
According to Irfan Helmy, a member of Fatwa Commission 
of MUI and a member of organizing committee of TPT, in 
response to terrorism and to support the state to counter 
terrorism, MUI, except issuing fatwa and establishing TPT, 
also cooperates with BNPT. MUI send its members to sit in 
BNPT organization (Interview with Irfan Helmy 12/07/2012). 
Additionally, MUI’s support to the state has been confirmed 
by the use of the state’s definition on terrorism as stated in 
its booklet containing fatwa on the matters of terrorism and 
nationalism. 
c. National Counter-Terrorism Body (BNPT)
The establishment of BNPT is referred to the Presidential 
Act Number 46 year 2010 about BNPT. But it was not until 
July 2011 BNPT was officially established as a centralized 
body of counter-terrorism agency (Putri, 2011: 48). It is equally 
positioned as the ministerial body. In the first consideration 
of the act, the state defines terrorism as “criminal act against 
humanity characterized as trans-national, well organized 
and having sophisticated network so that threatens national 
and international security”. According to chapter 23 of 
Presidential Act stated above, in doing its jobs BNPT creates 
Satuan Tugas (Divisions of Order) which can also cooperate 
with civil society groups and figures. It is worth noting that 
the establishment of BNPT, after eight years since the Bali 
attack in 2002, as a counter terrorism agency has marked 
significant shift within state’s approach toward terrorism. It is 
also to replace the previous Coordination Desk of Preventing 
Terrorism under the Indonesian Ministry of Coordinator of 
Politics and Security. 
Recently, the BNPT has established some representatives in 
some provinces. In Yogyakarta it is called Pokja Penaggulangan 
Terrorisme headed by K.H Muhaimin, a headmaster of 
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pesantren Nurul Ummahat in Kota Gede, Yogyakarta who is 
also a leading figure of NU in the province. For Muhaimin, 
the building of Pokja is meant to socialize the danger of 
terrorism through cultural approach. He admitted that, the 
security approach that dominates state’s policies dealing 
with eradicating terrorism has made more people especially 
Muslims perceive the state as too repressive. Moreover, it 
does not only cover the issue of terrorism as such but more 
identifying radical tendencies within society, although not 
explicitly waging violence in their actions (interview with K.H 
Abdul Muhaimin, 27/07/2012). 
In Kendari Southeastern Sulawesi province, BNPT 
established Forum Koodinasi Pencegahan Terrorisme/
FKPT (Coordination Forum of Preventing Terrorism). 
BNPT cooperated with Wahid Institute in holding two days 
workshop on July 24-25, 2012 in Kendari concerning the 
initiation of FKPT. According Professor Irfan Idris, head of 
Deradicalization Desk of the BNPT, FKPT is “expected to 
bear the wisdom of local radical actions through for example 
community leaders approach” (Kendari News, 23/07/12).
2.  Building Networks of Moderate Muslims
In this section, there are efforts the state has played in terms 
of building moderate Muslims networks that is worth noting. 
It can be seen from first is the holding of Inter-faith dialogues 
forums in which the state provides space for moderate Muslims 
to voice and second is building Muslim circles of anti-terrorism. 
The former focuses on the interfaith dialogue forums held by desk 
of Directorate of Public diplomacy at MOFA and the latter on 
establishing specific groups in response to terrorism and activities 
and programs held by BNPT, MUI and MORA. All of them are 
seen in the light of responding terrorism and radicalism.  
a. Incorporating Muslims through Interfaith Dialogue
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) involves in 
managing interfaith dialogues cooperated with NU and 
Muhammadiyah. The MOFA has facilitated the holding of 
International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS), in which the 
former chairman of NU Hasyim Muzadi acted as a director and 
Regional Interfaith Dialogue (RID) in which Muhammadiyah 
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co-host.  The factors behind holding the forums come from 
international and domestic factors (Banawiratama et.al. 2010: 
112). International factors can be summed up into three: first 
is the rise of terrorism. Second, many attacks and atrocities 
acted in the name of Islam which leads to the image making: 
Islamic terrorism. Third is US unilateral action through global 
war on terror. Whereas the domestic factors include: first is 
lack of institutional ability in hindering terrorism. Second is 
the misconception of Islam versus west rivalry. Third is the 
need to strengthen security action with democratization and 
human right. And the forth is the need to show Indonesian 
Islam to the world as a positive portrait.
The first ICIS was held in 2004 in Jakarta under the theme 
Upholding Islam as Rahmatan Lilalamin (a blessing for the entire 
universe). As noted by Muzadi the spirit of Islamic teachings 
in Indonesia has been rooted historically known as tawassuth 
(middle way). The acceptance of this middle way was signified 
by agreement of ICIS delegations coming from all over the 
world with different streams under the Jakarta Declaration. For 
him, moderation is not only projected by Indonesian Muslims 
but Muslims all over the world (Muzadi 2008: 206). Here, 
Muzadi appropriated a theological meaning of moderation 
which is sourced from Islamic percept.
The Second ICIS was held in June 2006 in Jakarta and 
coming with a grand theme, Program of Action to Uphold Islam 
as Rahmatan lil Alamin toward Global Justice and Peace. The 
conference was attended by more than 300 scholars from 54 
countries, not only from countries whose majority population 
Muslims, but also from countries where Muslims are minority. 
Whereas the third ICIS was held in July 2009 in Jakarta under 
the theme Islam as Rahmatan Lil ‘Alamin: Peace Building and 
Conflict Prevention in the Muslim World (Banawiratama et.al, 
2010, 99-101). 
Moreover, together with Muhammadiyah, the Ministry 
shares a common regional forum called Regional Interfaith 
Dialogue (RID). RID was first initiated by the Indonesia 
(former) minister of foreign affairs Hasan Wirajuda and 
Foreign Ministers of Australia Alexander Downer collaborated 
with Muhammadiyah. It was held in Yogyakarta in 2004 
under the theme Dialogue on Interfaith Cooperation: Community 
Building and Harmony. This meeting resulted in the initiation of 
International Center for Religious and Cultural Cooperation 
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as a permanent shared institution aimed at a mean to 
enhance cross-cultural dialogue and cooperation among 
religious believers and strengthening moderate networks and 
institutional capacity (Banawiratma et.al, 2010, 103-104). 
In this initial event, the participant articulated their 
agreement under the Yogyakarta Statement of Dialogue on 
Interfaith Cooperation. The participants expressed their 
recommendations in several points which can be summed 
up as: promoting interfaith dialogues and actions in order to 
gain peace and harmony among religious believers. One of the 
derived action plan of RID is the youth interfaith exchange in 
which young people from other country stay for a couple of 
time in a host family in different country with the different 
faith (Tabloid Diplomasi, 2008).
b. Building the Muslims Circle of Anti-Terrorism 
BNPT as a national counter-terrorism body has also 
played the role of building moderate Muslims. In the early of 
its establishment, BNPT immediately cooperates with MUI. In 
addition, MUI has issued fatwa haram on terrorism long before 
BNPT established. With its various branches and links in the 
regions across Indonesia, MUI is the potential counterpart for 
BNPT in dealing with counter terrorism and radicalism. In 
early November 2010, MUI with FKPMN (Forum Komunikasi 
Praktisi Media Nasional) held halaqah on counter-terrorism 
in MUI central branch in Jakarta. In that early meeting, Many 
Muslim figures and Ulama representing various organizations 
attended that halaqah. In the mean time, Ansyaad Mbai, head 
of BNPT, acted as the keynote speaker and panelist in halaqah. 
He stated clearly that since terrorism is an extra-ordinary 
crime trough which the actors aim at upholding Syariah and 
Daulah Islamiyah, there should be, in Mbai’s word, “an extra-
ordinary preventive action” (MUI, 20/11/10).
In the frame of “extra ordinary preventive action”, BNPT 
feels more confident in cooperating with Ulama, in this sense 
is MUI. In addition, Mbai described there are five modus 
operandi of terrorism. The first is, exemplifying government 
weakness; the second is flaming conflicts and making use of 
it; the third is by doing so, the actors got the government to 
respond repressively; the forth is the effort of attaining public 
sympathy; and the fifth is disseminating propaganda and 
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terrorist ideology. In this sense, for Mbai, BNPT will engage 
with Muslim clerics in “empowering moderate Muslims” 
such as those promoted by Muhammadiyah and NU (MUI, 
20/11/10).
In attaining its goals BNPT has run several programs 
including signing MoU with several notable Muslim 
organizations, especially NU and Muhammadiyah and 
their under-bows. Initial cooperation with MUI has marked 
as an “open-door” for BNPT to engage with other Muslim 
organizations. MUI is seen as the free pass, since this one 
represent Muslims and having influence toward Muslims 
religious lives. This is to say also the modernist and traditionalist 
Muslim streams as represented by Muhammadiyah and 
NU and other similar organizations could be seen in MUI’s 
formation. In addition, the State Islamic Universities have 
also been the BNPT counterparts from which BNPT recruit its 
director to say one is Professor Irfan from Alaudiddin State 
Islamic University acted as director of deradicalization desk. 
According to Djoko Suyanto, BNPT will go hand in hand with 
society dealing with its missions. This is to say that BNPT 
will very much engage with non-state actors especially with 
religious leaders.
BNPT has signed MoU on preventing radicalism with 
NU and Muslimat, a NU wing organization for women. The 
latter has held workshop on counter-radicalism in five cities. 
Siti Aniroh, a representative of Muslimat saw the importance 
of Muslimat to engage in the program because “terrorism 
has threatened NKRI (Indonesian unitary state) and brought 
about religious and social conflicts”. Moreover, the act of 
terror has given rise to trauma within societal life. As part of 
NU, Muslimat has huge resources of members and institutions 
around archipelago such as majlis taklim (religious circle), 
schools and pesantrens (NU Online, 17/02/12).
In the other side, MORA takes apart in responding 
terrorism. Although with limited budget allocated to the 
programs and there is no specific team for counter-terrorism, 
it is responsible for designing Islamic teaching curriculum 
(see, Ichwan, 2006). Indeed, officially, Islamic curriculum for 
schools from elementary to junior high and college are supplied 
by the MORA. The MORA designed workshops on the role 
of Pesantren Leaders in Developing Peace Culture. As stated by 
the MORA, the goals of the workshops are: first, building 
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networks among Pesantren in preventing religious radicalism; 
second, conceptualizing pesantren’s view on religious 
radicalism; third, seeking the best way to tackle radicalism. 
The workshops were held in six provinces: Lampung (Bandar 
Lampung), Central Java (Semarang), Jawa Timur (Jombang), 
Banten (Serang), East Kalimantan (Samarinda), West Nusa 
Tenggara (Mataram), Gorontalo (Gorontalo) dan Central 
Sulawesi (Palu) (Balitbang Kemenag, 10/04/12).
In response to terrorism and radicalism, it has engaged 
with BNPT and Lazuardi Biru, an NGO concerns on 
radicalism, in holding the workshops on deradicalization. In 
30 of November 2010, for example, the workshop titled “Peran 
Masyarakat dalam Penguatan Nilai-nilai Islam Rahmatan Lil 
‘Alamin untuk menangkal radikalisme dan Terorisme (the role of 
society in strengthening Islamic values as rahamatan lil-alamin 
in tackling radicalism and terrorism)” held in Jakarta attended 
by Nasaruddin Umar, (Directorate of Muslims counseling, 
the MORA), Komaruddin Hidayat (Rector of UIN Jakarta), 
Hasyim Muzadi (Former Chairman of PBNU), and Amirsyah 
Tambunan (representative of MUI). Acted as speakers, they 
were coming with almost similar frame on preventing the 
country from radicalism. According to Umar from MORA, 
the Ministry has designed three model of deradicalization: 
prevention, rehabilitation, and re-socialization/reintegration/ 
reengagement (Bimas Islam Kemenag, 01/12/10).
C. Imposing Moderate Islam
When the president issued the Presidential Act number 
46 on Counter Terrorism Body, the state has conceptualized 
a kind of more than just a definition of terrorism and how to 
respond it. Terrorism is defined as a crime against humanity 
with trans-national in character. This definition is also used by 
MUI in its fatwa on terrorism. Officially speaking, there is no 
such term radicalism attached to the text both the act and the 
fatwa.2 However, as noted in the previous chapter, radicalism 
is common to use among political and religious elites to 
point out groups and individuals having inclinations toward 
using violence. On the other hand, the term radicalism and 
its characteristic have broadened beyond what is informed by 
the term terrorism as it is obviously used interchangeably. The 
2   See Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 46 Tahun 2010.
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latter is informed as a threat toward the existence of nation-
state the former is a threat to Islam itself. Thus, it is common 
to hear that not a clash of civilization we wetness but a 
contestation between Muslims who prefer democracy, human 
right and pluralism and those against it and prefer force in 
their effort of articulating their interests (e.g. Hefner, 2002 and 
Esposito and Mogahed, 2007).
As it has been exemplified by those institutions, one 
cannot but to note that moderate Islam is Indonesian Islam. 
Following the models of Muslim polity based on Assyaukanie’s 
explanation, the proponents of democratic religious state are 
at play within those institutions. As stated by most political 
and religious elites previously, Indonesia is not an Islamic 
state, but accommodates all religions. So that to say, state’s 
incorporations of Muslim groups such as Muhammadiyah 
and NU, is the other message that both groups has committed 
to the Indonesian unitary model with Pancasila at hand. 
Terrorism in the eyes of the state is a real threat toward 
Indonesian nation-state. The prolonged debate of how Islam 
supposed to be placed within the state in Indonesia can be 
seen in this message.
Moreover, the issue of fatwa on terrorism which inserted 
with the fatwa of the problem concerning nationhood by MUI 
is portrayed as penetration of how religion is justified the very 
notion of becoming moderate and Indonesian Muslim. MUI’s 
engagement with BNPT, NU, Muhammadiyah, pesantrens 
and the associations of Ulama in countering radicalism has 
signified the very “building moderate Muslims networks”. 
This effort is inserted with the sense of becoming Indonesia, 
in SBY’s term keindonesiaan. Therefore, proving that one is a 
Muslim is not enough. Therefore, a Muslim should remain 
loyal to the state’s ideology.  
The message becomes real when we notice MOFA. 
Through its incorporation and engagement with NU and 
Muhammadiyah, it signifies the image of the state. The state 
through ministry of foreign affairs has clearly defined the 
moderate Islam. This notion comes up through its engagement 
with the non-state actors. In addition, there is a new division 
within the ministry of foreign affairs which concern on building 
relations with non-state actors called the directorate of public 
diplomacy. Through cooperation and institutional mediation, 
what the so called moderate Islam or Muslims not only appear 
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as such but at the same time and the most important is echoing 
the state’s interest. It is important to say that state has bolded 
the notion of moderate Islam through its jargon and activities.
D. Conclusion
Examining the state’s notion of moderate Islam and its 
role in constructing the notion, through its activities and 
programs has shown that the state imposes the notion by 
engaging with Muslim leaders in response to terrorism and 
radicalism. Having faced with crisis of legitimacy after the fall 
of New Order, the events of terrorist attacks happened within 
and without the country has meet the political expectation of 
the recent government to reclaim its ideology by imposing 
such notion of moderate Islam. Moderate Islam is seen as 
constructed image of the state in order to mobilize Muslims in 
response to terrorism and radicalism. 
In this regard, terrorism and radicalism is not merely a 
threat for the state as it is seen as a crime toward humanity as 
such. Nevertheless, the act of terrorism and the growing trend of 
radicalism have been perceived as threatening the very notion 
of Indonesian-long-established ideology, Indonesian unitary 
state and Pancasila. Indeed, this is “a blessing in disguise” to 
finish the “postponed homework” of providing Muslims with 
democratic political channel along with appropriating them 
with the idea of Indonesian unitary state. It was that for long 
ago Muslim polity suffered under authoritarian regime and 
has been left with no choice except to accept or to rebel with 
the risk is being sentenced as subversive.
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